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Financial Disclosure and Speculative Bubbles: An International Comparison
Abstract
This paper examines if a countrys financial disclosure system affects the 
likelihood of speculative bubbles.  We compare stock returns of eight countries that differ 
in the quality of their disclosure systems as ranked by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992).
We examine the hypothesis that stock prices of firms in countries with a low level of 
financial disclosure are more prone to speculative bubbles.  We employ the duration 
dependence model developed by McQueen and Thorley (1994) to test for the presence of 
bubbles.  We found that the returns in Japan, a country with a relatively low level of 
disclosure, shows evidence of a bubble. 
Key words: Financial Disclosure, Speculative Bubbles, Duration Dependence, and 
International Comparison.
Financial Disclosure and Speculative Bubbles: An International Comparison
I. Introduction 
The importance of financial reporting, as reflected in accounting standards, has 
been controversial among academicians.  What role, if any, financial disclosure has in 
determining security prices is not clear?  The strong form of the efficient market
hypothesis implies that such information is totally redundant.  Rational expectations 
theory predicts that investors always have unbiased forecasts of future values.  Excluding 
the very special case of rational expectations bubbles, speculative bubbles, if they exist, 
clearly are incompatible with rational expectations.1  The existence of speculative 
bubbles is also controversial.  It is nevertheless plausible to suppose that more stringent 
reporting requirements more closely align market values with fundamentals.
Several studies have claimed that poor accounting and financial reporting 
practices are the causes of the collapse of the U.S. financial market in October 1929 and 
the Southeast Asian market in the late 1990s (Zeff (1972) and MacDonald (1998)).
Greenspan (1998), Haley (2000), and Vishwanath and Kaufmann (2001) further 
suggested that accounting practices that help promote transparency make financial crisis 
less likely.  Rathman (1998) proposed the adoption of international accounting standards 
(IAS) as a means to improve disclosure quality among countries.  Support for 
standardized accounting standards internationally has increased over time.  One of the 
1 McQueen and Thorley (1994) defined a rational expectations bubble as a situation where stock prices
exceed fundamental value.  Even though investors know that security prices are not in line with the 
fundamentals, they do not liquidate their position.  They believe that the bubble will continue to grow.  The 
high return during the period the bubble grows is large enough to compensate for the loss when the bubble
bursts.  This provides the rationale to stay in the market.
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supposed benefits of standardizing accounting standards is that this will enhance market
efficiency.
This paper examines if the presence of speculative bubbles is related to a 
countrys financial disclosure level.  A countrys financial disclosure level refers to the 
quantity and intensity of information reported in meeting statutory requirements,
exchange filing and listing requirements, and capital market expectations (Saudagaran 
and Biddle (1992)).  Country disclosure rankings used in this paper are due to 
Saudagaran and Biddlehenceforth, S&B (1992).
The term speculative bubble is used in the general sense that high returns by 
themselves cause investors to bid prices higher, i.e., speculative bubbles are caused by
past price performance rather than underlying fundamentals. Disappointments are 
inevitable.  A speculative bubble, therefore, occurs when upswings are gradual and 
downswings are rapid; a return pattern that is asymmetric.  The duration dependence test 
is associated with rational expectations bubbles.  Duration dependence; however, will be 
observed whenever investors buy based solely on past price performance and drive prices 
above their fundamental values.
Research on speculative bubbles began with volatility tests.  Shiller (1981) found 
that U.S. stock prices during the period of 1871-1979 fluctuate too much assuming
perfect foresight and a constant discount rate.  The excess volatility of stock prices is 
consistent with stock prices that are characterized by speculative bubbles or mean-
reverting fads (Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981)).  The excess volatility results 
were controversial (see, for example, Flavin (1983), Kleidon (1986), and Marsh and 
Merton (1986), and West (1987)).  Flavin (1983) and Kleidon (1986) claimed that the 
 2 
excess volatility results were due to small sample bias, while Marsh and Merton (1986) 
attributed them to dividend smoothing by managers.  West (1987) developed a 
specification test that was similar to the Hausman (1978) test and applied it to the 
Standard & Poors 500 index during the 1871-1982 period and the Dow Jones index 
during the 1928-1978 period.  The test allowed for the no-misspecification and the no-
bubble hypotheses to be tested separately.  He found strong evidence consistent with the 
existence of bubbles.  Lo and MacKinlay (1988) found nonrandom walk behavior in 
weekly stock market returns from equally-and-value-weighted portfolios using the 
variance ratio test.
Most of the bubble tests such as the variance bound tests and volatility 
comparison tests assumed linearity of return patterns.  The presence of bubbles, however, 
implies that the pattern of returns is nonlinear.  In 1994, McQueen and Thorley developed 
a duration dependence test for bubbles.  The duration dependence test is different from
traditional bubble tests such as the autocorrelation, skewness, and kurtosis tests.  The 
duration dependence test directly addresses the issue of nonlinearility of returns.
Rational expectations bubbles have the characteristic that as the length of the 
bubble increases the probability of a crash decreases; otherwise the bubble cannot be 
sustained in a rational market.  The duration dependence test allows the probability of the 
end of a run to differ depending on the run length and on the type of run (positive or 
negative).  Rational expectations bubbles are very specific types of bubble requiring a 
specific relationship between a departure from fundamental values and the probability of 
a run ending.  The presence of speculative bubbles, a far more general phenomenon, is 
consistent with duration dependence.  Speculative bubbles are likely to exist if it is 
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observed that there is a negative relationship between the probability of a run of positive 
returns ending and the length of the run.  In other words, the presence of bubbles suggests 
positive duration dependence or a negative hazard rate.  McQueen and Thorley (1994) 
found evidence of speculative bubbles in the monthly real returns for both equally-and-
value-weighted portfolios of all NYSE stocks during the period of 1927 to 1991.
In this paper, we examine if financial disclosure has any effect on the likelihood 
of speculative bubbles.  That is, are stock markets in countries with less disclosure more
prone to speculative bubbles?  We focus on eight major international stock markets.  The 
eight countries are ranked from the highest to the lowest in terms of disclosure.  The 
countrys disclosure level rankings (DLR) are from a study done by Saudagaran and 
Biddle (1992).  According to S&B (1992), the United States has the highest disclosure 
level, followed in order by Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands, France, Japan, 
Germany, and Switzerland.2  We employ the nonparametric duration dependence test 
developed by McQueen and Thorley (1994) to test for the presence of bubbles.
The disclosure of financial information, unfortunately, is only one of many factors 
that differ among the countries we examine.  From this perspective our results cannot be 
viewed as conclusive.  Institutional factors across these countries differ in so many
aspects that it is difficult, if not impossible, to control for all of them.  In addition, the 
duration dependence test, unlike regression tests, does not allow for multiple effects.
The empirical results we obtain show that Japan, a country with a relatively low 
level of disclosure shows evidence consistent with the presence of a bubble, while 
2 According to Schienman (1979), Switzerland is known for the reluctance to disclose financial information
more than necessary.  Companies in Switzerland are required to provide only balance sheet and income
statement with minimum disclosure.  There is no format of financial statements and it is left to the
discretion of managers.
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countries in the high disclosure group do not show any evidence of bubbles.  However, 
the no-bubble hypothesis is not rejected for real returns of Germany and Switzerland. 
Both of which have very low disclosure levels.  The implications of our results are 
discussed in the concluding section.
The rest of the paper is organized as followed: Section II reviews the theory of 
capital market efficiency and bubbles.  Section III presents the duration dependence test 
procedure.  Section II and III follow McQueen and Thorley (1994) closely.  Section IV 
describes the data used and presents the empirical results of the test.  Section V presents 
the conclusions of the study. 
II. Rational Bubble Model 
If capital market is efficient the fundamental value of stock price equals the 
expected discounted present value of the future cash flows i.e. dividends.
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However, according to Shiller (1978), Blanchard and Watson (1982), and West (1987), 
equation (1) is not the only equilibrium solution.  Stock prices can be expressed in the 
following form and still be the solution to the equilibrium condition. 
(2) ttt BPP
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3 Market efficiency implies that the expected rate of return on a stock is equal the required rate of return,
E[Rt+1] = rt+1 where Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on the information set at time t and 
rt is the required rate of return, . Pt represents the stock price at time t and Dt+1
represents the future value of dividend at time t+1.  Assuming the rt+i =r i, current stock price equals the
expected future price and dividends discounted at the investors required rate of return,
.  The fundamental value of the assets, is obtained by substituting Pt+1 into
current stock price equation and solving recursively.
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where Et[Bt+1] = (1+rt+1)Bt and rt+1 is assumed to be non-stochastic.  Equation (2) 
indicates that stock prices, in equilibrium might not rationally reflect fundamental value.
Stock prices can deviate from their fundamental value because of the bubble (Bt)
component.  The bubble component can be zero but not negative because the security 
price must be non-negative.  A peculiarity of rational expectations bubble is that the 
bubble component must have always been present. 
Security prices can deviate from their fundamental value, in a rational market, by 
a bubble component (Bt) that grows at the constant rate of return (r).  The probability that 
a bubble grows must be greater than its corresponding probability of a crash to allow for 
large positive abnormal returns to compensate for the large negative returns when the 
market crashes.  When security prices contain rational bubbles, unexpected changes in 
price result from unexpected changes in the fundamental value.
(3) ,*11
*
11 )1( ttttt PrDP
and unexpected changes in the bubble components,
(4) tttt BrB )1( 111 .
In other words, the observable unexpected price change is the sum of changes in the 
fundamental ( and bubble components ( ,)1t )1t
(5) .111 ttt
The capital market efficiency hypothesis implies that the expected value of the 
change in prices ( is zero.  However, even if the market is efficient, the probability of
obtaining positive abnormal return can still be greater than one-half.  This is due to the 
skewness of the bubble innovations.  As the bubble grows, its innovation is positive but 
small compared to a one time but large negative innovation when the bubble bursts.  Such 
)1t
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inherent skewness of bubble innovations results in positive excess returns while the 
bubble continues.  The persistence of positive excess return induces positive 
autocorrelation and longer runs of positive excess returns than expected in the simple
model.
The traditional method for detecting speculative bubbles is to count the number of 
positive and negative returns.  If the bubbles are present, the probability of obtaining an 
abnormal number of positive returns is high.  McQueen and Thorley (1994) devised a 
new test for rational speculative bubbles.  Bubbles are characterized as a continuing 
increase in price or a long run of positive abnormal returns followed by a crash.  One of 
the characteristics of bubbles is a nonlinear pattern in returns.  If security prices contain a 
bubble, there will exist a run of positive abnormal returns that will exhibit duration 
dependence (a decreasing hazard rate).  In other words, the probability of observing the 
end of a positive run decreases with the length of the run, otherwise a bubble will quickly 
burst.
Tests of duration dependence can be implemented by examining the hazard rate 
(hi) for runs of positive and negative abnormal returns.  McQueen and Thorley (1994) 
defined the hazard rate as the probability of an observed negative innovation given a 
sequence of i prior positive innovations, hi = Prob( t < 0 t-1 > 0, t-2 >0, t-i > 0, t-i-1
< 0) decreases with i.  Specifically, if bubbles exist, the hazard rates for runs of positive 
excess return, hi+1 < hi for all i.4 This condition, however, does not hold for runs of 
negative abnormal returns because rational expectations bubbles cannot be negative.5
4 See original paper of McQueen and Thorley (1994) for full detail derivation of this equation.
5 In some certain situations, positive bubbles are also ruled out.  For example, bubbles cannot exist if the 
market participants have infinite horizons (Tirole (1982)) and if assets have terminal values (Brock (1982)). 
Tirole (1985) also argued that bubbles cannot occur if the interest rate is greater than the growth rate of 
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Therefore, duration dependence (a decreasing hazard rate) in a positive run, but not in 
negative runs, is consistent with the existence of rational bubbles.6  Unlike the traditional 
bubble tests such as autocorrelation, skewness, and kurtosis, duration dependence test 
allows for a nonlinear pattern of returns.
Speculative bubbles are a far more general and a far more likely phenomenon
than rational expectations bubbles.  Speculative bubbles are characterized by what some
have referred to as irrational exuberance (Shiller, 2000, p.3).  If a significant number of 
investors trade on noise, random positive innovations in price may be perceived as 
indicating even higher returns in the future.  If price increases induce even greater price 
innovations, then herding behavior can lead to positive duration dependence. 
The existence of speculative bubbles is, of course, controversial.  Ultimately, it is 
an empirical issue.  There is enough evidence to suggest that it is not unreasonable to 
consider whether or not the disclosure system affects the likelihood of bubbles emerging
in a market.
III. Duration Dependence Test Procedure 
In this paper, the duration dependence test is performed on the transformed real 
returns in both dollar-denominated and local currencies.  The major reason for using 
dollar-denominated currency is the growing interest in the international equity markets.
Investors possibly view stocks in an international framework and the dollar is the 
international currency.
economy.  Assets that are subject to price bubbles must have a resale value, and a fixed supply (Merton
(1987)).
6 McQueen and Thorley (1994) show that inequality condition hi+1 < hi also holds even when fundamental
innovations are not symmetrically distributed.
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We first transform the monthly real returns series of each country into run lengths 
of positive and negative returns.  A run is a sequence of returns that has the same sign.
For example, for a data set that consists of ten observations, the maximum numbers of 
runs can be ten, while the minimum numbers of runs can be one.  Hence, the data series 
consist of a set, ST where T is the number of observations on the random run length, i.
For each country, the return series being tested are two groups of T observations of 
positive and negative runs where the number of observations in each group does not 
necessary have to be equal.  The hazard function (hi), is defined as hi  Prob(I=i I i)7
represents the probability that a specific run ends at length i, provided that it lasts until 
length i.  McQueen and Thorley (1994) defined the log likelihood function of hazard 
function as follows:
(6) L( ST)  = N
1i
i Ln hi + Mi Ln(1-hi) + Qi Ln(1-hi).
The functional form for the hazard function is based on the logistic transformation of the 
log of i.
(7)
)(1
1
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where Ni is the number of completed runs of length i in the sample. Mi  and Qi are the 
numbers of completed and partial runs with length greater than i.8  Partial runs are the 
runs that occur at the beginning or at the end of the period investigated.  For illustrative 
purposes, the number of runs of each length for a return series that starts with three 
7 The hazard function, rather than density function is used because the former describes the data in terms of 
conditional probabilities while the latter emphasizes on unconditional probabilities.  The hazard function is 
more relevant to this research because we examine the probability of a run continues conditioned on the 
length of the run.  However, the hazard function is also related to the density function.  Hazard rate can be 
defined as hi = fi/(1-Fi) where fi is the discrete density function and Fi is the cumulative density function for
i.
8 According to McQueen and Thorley (1994), Qi can be ignored when the sample size is large.
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positive returns followed by two negative returns, three positive, and one negative will be 
1 negative run of length two and 1 positive run of length three.  The sample estimated
hazard rate for length i is defined as follows: 
(8)
)(

ii
i
i
NM
Nh .
The null hypothesis of no bubble implies that the probability of a run ending is 
unrelated to the prior returns, or the probability of obtaining positive and negative 
abnormal returns is random regardless of the prior sequence.  In other words, the null 
hypothesis of no duration dependence is that  = 0 or a constant hazard rate.  The 
alternative hypothesis of a bubble being present suggests that the probability of a positive 
run ending should decrease with the length of the run or, specifically, the value of 
parameter , should be negative (decreasing hazard rate). 
Duration dependence tests are performed by substituting equation (7) into (6) and 
maximizing the log likelihood function with respect to  and .  The hazard function is 
estimated as a Logit regression in which the independent variable is the log of the current 
run length and the dependent variable is 1 if the run ends in the next period and 0 if it 
does not.  Under the null hypothesis of no bubble (  = 0), the likelihood ratio test (LRT) 
is asymptotically distributed 2 with one degree of freedom.
(9) LRT  =  2[Log Unrestricted - Log Restricted] .21
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IV. Empirical Results
4.1 Data 
The data used in this study consist of two parts.  The first part is the ranking of 
countrys disclosure levels based on the study done by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992).
The second set consists of the end of month stock price indices including dividend 
income of all eight countries.  Both dollar-denominated and local currency price indices 
are used.  The stock price data are the Capital International indices constructed by 
Morgan Stanley.  The data were collected on-line from Morgan Stanley for the period 
January 1970 to August 2000 for a total of 368 observations. 
4.1.1 Countrys Disclosure Ranking 
A ranking of disclosure levels is assigned to the eight countries by using the 
financial disclosure index created by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992).  Table 1 shows the 
results of countrys disclosure level rankings (DLR) based on studies done by S&B in 
1992.9  In 1992, S&B created a new country disclosure index from a survey result of 142 
experts who engaged in the process of listing securities in the foreign stock exchanges.
The participants (63 U.S. and 79 non-U.S.) were people from different fields of business 
such as corporate managers, investment bankers, public accountants, stock exchange 
officers, academics, and so on.  The financial disclosure level is designed to include both 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures.  The participants ranked the countries in three 
areas: statutory reporting requirements, exchange reporting requirements, and capital 
9 In 1989, S&B constructed country disclosure indices by taking the average of the ranking obtained from
three previous studies done by Lafferty & Cairns (1980), Choi & Bavishi (1982), and Cairns et al (1984).
The results suggest that firms in the United States (a disclosure rank of 8) had the highest levels of 
disclosure, followed in order by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Japan, Germany,
and Switzerland.
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market expectations.  S&B (1992) rankings also provide overall disclosure level scores.
The United States is the country that has the most comprehensive disclosure level, 
followed in order by Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Japan, 
Germany, and Switzerland.10
Saudagaran and Biddleshenceforth S&B (1992) country disclosure ranking is 
used in this study for several reasons:  First, it is the most comprehensive and widely 
used country disclosure index (see, for example, Alford, Jones, Leftwich and Zmijewski
(1993), Saudagaran and Biddle (1995), and Higgins (1998)).  Second, S&Bs (1992) 
rankings include both voluntary and mandatory disclosures while other disclosure studies 
rankings are based solely on mandatory disclosure.  Third, the S&B index is the most
recent ranking and is consistent with previous studies (see, for example, Lafferty and 
Carins (1980), Choi and Bavishi (1982), and Cairns, Lafferty and Mantle (1984)). 
Table 2 shows the summary of financial reporting requirements of eight countries 
prepared by Alford et al. (1993).  This summary shows the areas of diversity in 
accounting standards across countries.  The sources of GAAP for all countries except the 
United States and Canada are derived from government sources only.  U.S. GAAP is 
derived from both public (SEC) and private (FASB) sources, while Canadian GAAP is 
derived from a private source.  According to Ali and Hwang (2000), countries where the 
private sectors do not get involved in setting accounting standards are associated with 
less value relevant financial reports.  The U.S. disclosure requirements are the most
comprehensive in terms of meeting both statutory and investors demands.  There is a 
relation among the sources of GAAP, level of alignment between financial and tax 
10 The results are consistent with the previous studies conducted in 1989 except that the order of countries
in the high disclosure group is changed.
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accounting, and a countrys disclosure level.  Countries with low levels of disclosure are 
associated with a high level of alignment between financial and tax reporting 
requirements.  High conformity between tax and financial reports encourages firms to 
reduce taxes by reporting lower profits; hence the published financial reports are less 
valuable for financial analysis (Ali and Hwang (2000)).
Table 2 also shows the diversity in frequency and timing of financial reports.
U.S. and Canada require quarterly financial reports, while other countries require 
semiannual financial reports.  Switzerland with the lowest disclosure level does not 
require any interim financial reports.  While the U.S. allows the shortest lag in the interim
report (48 days), other countries allow longer interim report lags (4 months).  The annual 
reporting lag ranges from the shortest of 90 days (U.S.) to the longest of eight months
(Japan).11
4.1.2 Description of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Price Indices
We examine the eight stock markets for which disclosure rankings are available.
They are the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Japan, 
Germany, and Switzerland.  The data cover the sample period of January 1970 through 
August 2000.  The price data are value-weighted indices with dividends.  They are 
computed from end-of-month prices of a large sample of firms in each national equity 
market.  The data in both dollar-denominated and local currencies were obtained on-line 
from Morgan Stanley. 
11 The accounting standard in Japan is dual in the sense that the extent of disclosure in annual reports is
prescribed by both the Commercial Code (CC) and the Securities and Exchange Law (SEL).  The financial
reports prepared under the CC, which are distributed to the shareholders, contain less information than
those prepared under the SEL, which are reported to the Stock Exchange, but not sent to the shareholders
(Cooke (1993)).
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Duration dependence tests are implemented on continuously compounded
monthly real returns of eight countries for both dollar-denominated and local currencies.
To compute the continuously compounded nominal returns, Rt, we use the following 
formula:
(10) Rt  =  ln Pt  ln Pt-1,
where Pt represents the price index at the end of the month for period t.  To create the 
continuously compounded monthly real returns in dollar-denominated currency, 
continuously compounded U.S. monthly inflation rates are subtracted from continuously 
compounded monthly nominal returns.  Monthly continuously compounded real returns 
in local currency are created by subtracting continuously compounded monthly inflation 
rates of each country from their respective continuously compounded monthly nominal
returns.  Monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) data of each country are collected from
International Financial Statistics (IFS) Database and Handbook published by the 
International Monetary Fund.  Continuously compounded monthly inflation rates are 
calculated by taking the first difference of the natural log of the monthly CPI.
There are advantages to using the Morgan Stanley indices.  First, the indices 
cover at least 60% of the total market capitalization for each country and they are 
constructed on a uniform basis across countries.12  The indices are constructed so as not 
to include stocks with multiple-listings on foreign stock exchanges.  This eliminates the 
problem of double counting stocks.  Second, the MSCI indices do not include the stock of 
companies that are non-domiciled and that have high cross-ownership.  Firms that have 
high reciprocal ownership provide a continuous flow of information among firms,
making access to inside information easier and publicly available information less useful.
12 Construction of MSCI indices can be obtained from http://www.msci.com
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The avoidance of double counting is important for this study due to the different 
disclosure levels between countries.  According to the U.S. disclosure regulations, stocks 
of the companies that are non-domiciled but listed on the U.S. stock exchange must
follow U.S disclosure rules and regulations.  Including the multiple-listed stocks would 
distort the results of this study.
Figures 1 through 4 show the plots of these indices in dollar-denominated and 
local currencies.  The graph shows that stock markets in all eight countries except Japan 
were on an upward trend during the past thirty years.  The sharp drop for the Japanese 
indices occurred around March 1990.  For the other countries, the value of stock indices 
plunged in October 1987.
Tables 3 and 4 provide summary statistics of monthly real returns in dollar-
denominated and local currencies for all eight countries.  The means of the stock return 
series in both currencies are all positive, indicating that stock markets in those countries 
were trending upward over the thirty-year period.  When measured in dollars, the 
Netherlands (a disclosure rank of 5) has the highest average monthly returns, 0.83 
percent, while Canada (a disclosure rank of 7) has the lowest average stock returns of 
0.51 percent.  France (a disclosure rank of 4) has the most volatile market as indicated by 
the highest standard deviation (6.70%), while the returns of the United States (a 
disclosure rank of 8) have the lowest volatility (4.50%).  The results are the same in 
dollar and in local currencies except Japan (a disclosure rank of 3) has the lowest mean
return denominated in yen.
The dollar-denominated real returns of all countries, except the United Kingdom
and Japan, show significant negative skewness coefficients.  When local currencies are 
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used, all the countries show significant negative skewness, consistent with the presence 
of bubbles.  The significance of the excess kurtosis coefficients in the return series of all 
the countries in both dollar-denominated and local currencies indicates that the return 
distribution has fat tails when compared to a normal distribution.  The fat tail finding 
implies that price changes occasionally deviate by large amounts.  High kurtosis in return 
series is a possible indication of bubbles.  In terms of dollar-denominated returns, Canada 
shows the highest negative skewness, while the United Kingdom shows the highest 
kurtosis.  The United Kingdom has the highest skewness and excess kurtosis coefficients 
when returns in pounds are used.  The large value of excess kurtosis indicates that the 
return data are leptokurtic with a sharper peak than the Gaussian distribution.13  The 
evidence of skewness and kurtosis indicates significant third and fourth moments.
During a bubble expansionary period, returns will exhibit positive serial 
dependence.  Tables 3 and 4 also provide the results of the first six sample
autocorrelations and the Ljung-Box portmanteau test statistics (Q) for the sixth and 
twelve-order autocorrelations for real returns in dollar-denominated and local currencies.
The first and second order autocorrelations are very small for all the countries.  When
dollar-denominated returns are used, the Ljung-Box (1978) portmanteau test statistic 
shows that the null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation is only rejected for the returns 
at lag six for the United Kingdom.14  Moreover, the Ljung-Box portmanteau test statistic 
with twelve lags indicates the presence of serial autocorrelation for the dollar-
denominated returns of Japan.  When returns in local currencies are used, the Ljung-Box 
13 A Gaussian distribution has a kurtosis of 3. 
14 The chi-square critical values for six degree of freedom at five and ten percent level of significance are 
12.59 and 10.64, respectively.  With twelve degrees of freedom, the chi-square value at five and ten percent
level of significance are 21.03 and 18.55, respectively.
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portmanteau test statistics with twelve lags rejects the null hypothesis of no serial 
autocorrelation for returns in the Netherlands and Switzerland at a less than five percent 
level of significance. 
Conventional methods such as tests of skewness, excess kurtosis, and 
autocorrelation for detecting the serial dependence of the returns assume the stationarity 
and linearity of returns.  The degree of serial dependence among successive price changes 
could be highly nonstationary during a period characterized by bubbles.  Hence, an 
autocorrelation test that assumes stationarity of returns may have low statistical power in 
detecting the presence of bubbles.  The next section provides the empirical results based 
on the duration dependence test.
4.2 Empirical Results
Tables 5 and 6 report the positive and negative run frequency, sample hazard rate 
for each run length, Log-Logistic test, and Log Likelihood ratio test for dollar-
denominated real returns of countries under investigation.  Japan (a disclosure rank of 3) 
shows the longest positive run of 16 months, followed by Germany (a disclosure rank of 
2) with a positive run of 14 months.  The U.S., France, and Switzerland show the shortest 
positive run of 9 months.
For real returns in local currencies, Japan also shows the longest positive run of 
15 months.  This is followed by Canada, the Netherlands, and Germany with a positive 
run that lasts for 12 months (Table 7).  Among the eight countries, France reports the 
shortest positive run lengths lasting only 8 months.
The negative runs were typically shorter in length, the longest negative run lasts 
only for 10 and 9 months in both dollar-denominated and local currencies, respectively.
 17 
In terms of dollar-denominated currency, the Netherlands reported the longest negative 
run, while U.S., U.K., France, and Germany have the longest negative run in the local 
currency.  Japan reports the shortest negative runs length of 6 months is dollar-
denominated currency; while Switzerland reported the shortest negative run lengths of 6 
months in its own currency.  It is interesting to note that Japan, a country with a relatively 
low disclosure level, has the longest positive and the shortest negative runs.  This pattern 
suggests nonrandom behavior of returns that is consistent with the presence of bubbles.
The sample hazard rates as shown in equation (8), are also reported in Tables 5 
through 8.  The sample hazard rate determines the probability that a run ends at particular 
length i (bubble bursts) given that a particular return of the same sign observed in a row 
that lasts until i (bubble grows).15  As shown in Tables 5 and 6, for Japan, there are 93 
positive runs and 93 negative runs for a total of 186 runs of real returns (dollar-
denominated currency).  There are 46 runs of positive returns that last at least for one 
month.  19 out of 46 runs end in the second month.  In other words, there is 41.30 percent 
probability that runs will end in the second month.  Out of the remaining 27 runs, 14 runs 
last for two months, that is, 51.85 percent will end in the third month.  Out of the 
remaining 13 runs, 7 runs last at least three months, 53.85 percent end in the fourth 
month and of the remaining 6 runs that last at least four months, only 2 or 33.33 percent 
end in the fifth month and so on.  In other words, given a positive run that lasts for three 
consecutive months, there is a 53.85 percent probability that the return in the next period 
will be negative, or bubble bursts.  The hazard rate of other countries can be interpreted 
in the same way.
15 Actual run counts do not include the partial runs, which may occur at the beginning or at the end of the
period investigated.
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In the absence of a speculative bubble, the hazard rate should be constant.  For 
runs of positive dollar-denominated real returns, the hazard rates of all countries are 
relatively constant for runs of length one to two.  There is no particular decreasing or 
increasing pattern of the hazard rate at horizon beyond two for all the countries except the 
U.S., U.K., and France.  The sample hazard rates of these countries show a consistent 
decreasing pattern for runs of three to five (42.31%, 20.00%, and 16.67% for the U.S., 
51.72%, 28.57%, and 20.00% for the U.K., and 37.50%, 20.00%, and 16.67% for France, 
respectively), evidence consistent with the presence of bubbles.  The hazard rates of 
negative runs are relatively constant for all countries.  The results are consistent when 
local currencies are used.  All the countries show relatively constant hazard rates at 
lengths one to three.  The hazard rate of France, and Switzerland declines at length four 
to six (42.86%, 37.50%, and 20.00% for France, and 50.00%, 37.50%, and 20.00% for 
Switzerland, respectively).  There is not a decreasing or increasing pattern for the hazard 
rate of negative runs of any country except the U.S.  The United States shows a 
decreasing pattern at length two to four (57.14%, 46.67%, and 37.50%).
Specifically, the duration dependence test emphasizes on the characteristic of 
hazard rates.  The anti-bubble hypothesis implies a constant hazard rate ( = 0), a 
probability of observing a negative or positive abnormal return should be the same.  A 
bubble hypothesis implies a negative slope of the hazard function ( < 0) for runs of 
positive not negative abnormal returns.  Maximizing the log likelihood function (9) gives 
the estimates for and .
Table 9 provides the summary of Log-Logistic tests, beta values, the Log-
likelihood ratios, and P-values of all the countries in both currencies.  For positive runs of 
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monthly dollar-denominated real returns, all countries, except the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands, show negative betas.  However, the magnitude of the coefficients are 
relatively small except for Japan with the highest beta, 0.384.  For positive runs of 
monthly real returns in local currency, U.S., U.K., Japan, and Germany yield negative 
betas.  Again, Japan has a slightly smaller beta of 0.297.
For runs of positive real returns (dollar-denominated currency), the likelihood 
ratio test in equation (9) of the no-bubble null hypothesis or = 0 is rejected at a five 
percent significance level for Japan.  When local currencies are used, the null hypothesis 
of no bubble cannot be rejected for all countries.16  For runs of negative real returns, we 
reject the null hypothesis of a constant hazard rate for the Netherlands (dollar-
denominated currency) and Switzerland (local currency) at the 10% level.17
  The positive duration dependence finding for Japan is consistent with the 
presence of a bubble.  Duration dependence of dollar denominated returns for Japan is 
not due to the exchange rate.  Positive duration dependence was not found in the 
exchange rate series.  Whether or not these findings lend support to the null hypothesis 
that speculative bubbles are more likely to be present in a country with a low level of 
disclosure is discussed in the next section. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper used the duration dependence test to examine the hypothesis that a 
lack of disclosure makes speculative bubbles more likely.  This approach is based on the 
16 The test was marginally significant for the yen-denominated and pound-denominated real returns.
17 While there cannot be a negative rational expectations bubble, it is possible to have negative speculative
bubbles.
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plausible hypothesis that the better informed that investors are, the less likely it is that 
prices will deviate from fundamental values. 
Japan, a country with a low level of disclosure, shows evidence consistent with 
the existence of a bubble.  This, however, is not conclusive evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis.  Switzerland has the lowest level of disclosure but the no-bubble hypothesis 
is not rejected in that case.  For several reasons, Switzerland, however, may not be 
representative.  The Swiss traditionally have a high stake in maintaining both secrecy and 
conservative business practices.  This may make the Swiss unrepresentative.  There is, 
however, no clear pattern for the remaining countries.  It is also important to note that the 
duration dependence test is unlikely to find a bubble unless there is strong evidence to 
suggest that the no-bubble hypothesis should be rejected.
We would not expect that a low level of disclosure will always produce a bubble.
Speculative bubbles are episodic events.  We conjecture that the proponents of a 
relationship between bubbles and disclosure, would at most argue that low disclosure 
makes bubbles more likely.  This research seems to suggest that speculative bubbles and 
disclosure, particularly in the international context is warranted.
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      Figure 1:   Monthly MSCI Nominal Equity Indices Value (US Currency) for
        Countries With Relatively High Disclosure (January 1970-August 2000)
      Figure 2:   Monthly MSCI Nominal Equity Indices Value (US Currency) for
        Countries With Relatively Low Disclosure (January 1970-August 2000)
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Figure 3:   Monthly MSCI Nominal Equity Indices Value (Local Currency) for
  Countries With Relatively High Disclosure (January 1970-August 2000)
Figure 4:   Monthly MSCI Nominal Equity Indices Value (Local Currency) for
  Countries With Relatively Low Disclosure (January 1970-August 2000)
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          Table 1
  Country Disclosure Level Ranks1
    Saudagaran and Biddle (1992)
Country Overall2 Disclosure2
Disclosure Level
 Levels Rank (DLR)
The United States 7.28 8
Canada 6.41 7
The United Kingdom 6.02 6
The Netherlands 4.75 5
France 4.17 4
Japan 3.83 3
Germany 3.81 2
Switzerland 2.60 1
1. This country's disclosure ranking is obtained from the study done be by Saudagaran and Biddle
    (1992).  The disclosure rank is based on the survey results of 142 experts.
2.  Overall disclosure level is based on three areas of disclosure: statutory reporting requirement,
    exchange reporting requirement, and capital market expectation.  See original paper for the score
    of disclosure in each area.
3. The higher DLR indicates higher disclosure level where '8' ('1') represents the highest (lowest)
    disclosure level.  The DLR provided by this survey is the same as the DLR conducted by
    Saudagaran and Biddle (1989) except the rank for Canada is changed from 5 to 7.







Table 9
  Summary of the Log-Logistic Test of Duration Dependence1
The United States, Canada, The United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, and Switzerland
 (January 1970-August 2000)
US Currency Local Currency
Disclosure Positive Negative Positive Negative
Level2 Country Runs Runs Runs Runs
8 The United States -0.096 -0.357 -0.096 -0.357
LRT3 0.209 1.673 0.209 1.673
P-Value (0.6476) (0.1958) (0.6476) (0.1958)
7 Canada -0.011 -0.193 0.101 -0.249
LRT 0.003 0.497 0.209 0.856
P-Value (0.9581) (0.4807) (0.6479) (0.3550)
6 The United Kingdom 0.005 -0.276 -0.299 -0.061
LRT 0.001 0.834 2.315 0.040
P-Value (0.9809) (0.3611) (0.1281) (0.8413)
5 The Netherlands 0.201 -0.585 0.010 -0.420
LRT 0.929 3.476* 0.002 1.140
P-Value (0.3352) (0.0622) (0.9616) (0.2856)
4 France -0.079 0.002 0.214 -0.151
LRT 0.138 0.000 0.848 0.319
P-Value (0.7104) (0.9948) (0.3572) (0.5742)
3 Japan -0.384 -0.045 -0.297 0.131
LRT 3.841** 0.021 2.168 0.170
P-Value (0.0500) (0.8843) (0.1409) (0.6803)
2 Germany -0.231 -0.230 -0.286 0.000
LRT 1.271 0.710 1.992 0.000
P-Value (0.2595) (0.3993) (0.1582) (0.9998)
1 Switzerland -0.005 -0.177 0.105 0.667
LRT 0.000 0.389 0.230 3.469*
P-Value (0.9839) (0.5326) (0.6314) (0.0625)
1. The Log-Logistic function is hi = 1/1+e
-( Ln i)
2. The disclosure index is obtained from the study done by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) where the highest
    number represents the highest disclosure level.
3. The critical value of with 1 degree of freedom at 5% and 10% significance level are 3.8415 and 2.7055
    respectively.
4. * Indicates significance at 5 percent level.
5. ** Indicates significance at 10 percent level.
